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Abstract 
This essay brings fiscal federalism theory into contact with the knowledge 
perspective to economic organization. The question addressed is: can a central 
government be justified in the context of fiscal federalism on grounds of 
economic organization? We point out that if one looks at the organizational 
problem of the vertical structure of the public sector from the standpoint of 
knowledge asymmetry the question of a central government in a federation 
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 1. Introduction. 
Much of public finance and public choice is concerned with the division of 
competences among and within different public institutions in the effort to 
render the machinery of state organization less wasteful (cf. e.g. Inman and 
Rubinfeld 1997a,b). So much has this organizational concern been central that 
the problem of fiscal federalism (Hayek 1948, Ch. 12; Tiebout 1956; Tullock 
1969; Oates 1972) has been recently equated with the problem of the vertical 
structure of the public sector (Oates 1999). 
  Some scholars started to endogenize modern contributions on the 
economics of organization – such as principal-agent (e.g. Alchian and 
Demsetz 1972), transaction cost (Williamson, e.g., 1985), and property right 
(e.g. Grossman and Hart 1986) theories – into the theoretical framework of 
fiscal federalism (e.g. Weingast 1995; Crémer et al. 1996; Seabright 1996; 
Saiegh and Tommasi 2000; Iaryczower et al. 2001).1 The distilled essence of 
these recent studies fusing federal and organizational theories is that the three 
putative roles of allocation, distribution, and stabilization ascribed to the state 
(Musgrave 1959) are not performed by a mysterious production function 
(Qian and Weingast 1997). 
                                                 
1 Related studies include: Persson and Tabellini (1996a,b) and Alesina and Perotti (1998). 
 
1   The purpose of this essay is to introduce some of the insights of the 
knowledge-based approach to economic organization into the theoretical 
framework of federalism.2 The question addressed is: can a central 
government be justified on grounds of economic organization in the context 
of federalism? We point out that if one looks at the organizational problem of 
the vertical structure of the public sector from the standpoint, not of 
information asymmetry, but of knowledge asymmetry, the question of a 
central government in a federation becomes primarily a story of coordination 
of dispersed and specific knowledge. 
  The essay seems particularly timely if one considers the tendency 
toward an increased European Union (EU) centralization. The recent 
enlargement of the EU that sees the inclusion of 10 additional countries by 
2004 is in fact accompanied by strong intentions to have greater 
centralization.3 Furthermore, in the draft of the EU Constitutional Treaty – 
                                                 
2 The knowledge-based theory of organization is also known as routine, competence or 
capability perspective (e.g. Nelson and Winter 1982; Langlois 1984; Dosi and Marengo 1994; 
Teece and Pisano 1994; and Langlois and Foss 1999). 
3 The Copenhagen European Council established that on 1 May 2004 the EU will be enlarged 
by the entry of ten new countries: the ones from the ex-communist bloc: Hungary, Slovenia, 
the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia and Poland; plus Malta and Cyprus. 
 
2 recently made public by the President of the EU Convention, Valéry Giscard 
d’Estaing – this tendency toward centralization permeates plainly. 
 
2. Information Asymmetry. 
For analytical purposes, we may partition the theoretical approaches to 
problems of economic organization into two broad categories: information 
asymmetry and knowledge asymmetry. Let us consider each in turn. 
  Information asymmetry entails that parties sharing an economic effort 
also ultimately share the same information set. The problem arises in trying to 
figure out which, of a series of possible events within the shared information 
set, will manifest; and the problem is usually solved by attaching a 
probability distribution, subjective or objective, to the likelihood of one event 
or another. 
  The clearest illustration of this is probably the principal-agent problem. 
Consider the case of moral hazard. The real problem in this case is that of the 
principal. The principal must in fact design a second-best incentive 
mechanism that induces the agent to pick the action (or effort) that maximizes 
the expected utilities of both. The solution to such problem is a contract for 
incentive alignment that is a function of observed output.  The solution is 
possible because principal and agent share the random variable and the 
 
3 density function associated with observable but stochastic production (e.g. 
Holmström and Tirole 1989, p. 89). 
  If we translate this logic to the organization of fiscal federalism, the 
conclusion is straightforward. One could justify centralized government on 
organizational grounds merely on the basis that it serves the same purpose of 
a principal in a principal-agent scenario. That is, the central government may 
be interpreted as a principal that keeps the incentives of federated states 
(agents) aligned through some incentive mechanism. 
  For concreteness, think for example about the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP) of the EU. The SGP is mostly in the nature of a fiscal constitution. 
As such, we may surely liken it to an incentive contract. The primary 
motivation for the SGP is in fact to guarantee stability in prices as well as 
budgetary discipline after the introduction of the common currency. To such 
end, it establishes that the members of the Monetary Union keep the deficit-
GDP ratio below 3 percent and the public debt-GDP below 60 percent. The 
responsibility to keep these figures aligned rests on the member states. If the 
states fail to do so they will face sanction on behalf of the EU Council. 
 
3. Knowledge Asymmetry. 
What would happen, however, if the parties were not involved in a known-
and-agreed-upon optimization problem? Or, to phrase the question more 
 
4 specifically, is information asymmetry a necessary and sufficient condition to 
explain a centralized government from an economics of organization 
perspective? 
  It is in attempting to answer these questions that the insights of the 
knowledge asymmetry approach to organization can be of some aid. In this 
less-known literature comparative-institutional analysis is fundamental for 
issues of coordination of different, specific knowledge.4 Different governance 
structures, public or private, exist primarily to internalize externalities 
concerning production and exchange; or, in short, problems of economic 
organization or knowledge. More precisely, different governance structures 
are seen to exist not only for the internalization of physical externalities, such 
as nuisance or pollution, but also, to put it in transaction-cost terms, for the 
internalization of informational or public-good externalities.5 Moreover, 
different structures not only differ in their ability to internalize externalities, 
but also differ in their ability to create externalities in the form of productive 
                                                 
4 This literature sees not only Coase (1937) as seminal, but also, inter alia, Hayek (1948, Chs. 
2, 4, and 5), Penrose (1959), and Richardson (1972). 
5 See among others: Coase (1960); Dahlman (1979); Nelson and Winter (1982); Langlois 
(1984); Dosi and Marengo (1994); Teece and Pisano (1994); and Langlois and Foss (1999). 
Relatedly, cf. also Jensen and Meckling (1992) and Ghoshal et al. (1995). 
 
5 contexts not otherwise achievable (cf. e.g. Egidi 1992; Ghoshal et al. 1995, esp. 
pp. 756-8). 
  The difference between the different organizational approaches (i.e., 
information versus knowledge) can be easily shown by again making 
reference to our principal-agent illustration. The principal-agent scenario, we 
hinted, allows the categorization of possible states of nature: fire/no fire, 
win/loss, shirking/no shirking, respect of the SGP parameters/no respect of 
the SGP parameters, etc. 
  For instance, even though there may be asymmetric information 
regarding the effort in input, one assumes that all concerned parties know 
that output could be a function of only, for simplicity, two states: maximum 
(a1) or minimum (a2)  effort. Even if the relationship a1 > a2 may in an 
immediate post-contractual phase be fully known only to the agent, under 
information asymmetry the principal can always attach, as noted, some 
probability to the likelihood of each action. 
  Under knowledge asymmetry we are conversely not able to classify, 
e.g., a performance according to probability distributions, for we are 
uncertain not only about, e.g., which action will be exercised, but also about 
which actions are even possible. To wit, one does not know about the 
relationships among the actions {ai} ∈ A, i = 1, …, n; and one does not even 
know about the set A. 
 
6   To illustrate, consider once more the principal-agent scenario. Assume 
that the agent has at disposal the just-mentioned A  as his set of actions. 
Additionally assume that the principal has imperfect information over A, that 
is, A is the improper superset of the information set P = {p1, p2, …, pj, …} of the 
principal (A  ⊇  P). When agent and principal share some information by 
assuming  P  to be a partition of A, we have problems that are solved by 
increasing the cardinality of P (viz., increasing the elements of P) by, say, 
observing a vast number of actions a ∈ A. In this case interacting parties are 
able to achieve equal information structures through equal cardinality 
because they share the same set of possible future events. 
  But if, for instance, A ⊃ P (partial knowledge) or, more exceptionally, A 
∩  P  =  ∅ (complete ignorance), then observation of action does not 
automatically lead to an increase in the elements of the repertoire of the 
principal: there’s a knowledge gap not easily overcome by just monitoring. 
The principal’s A is not, at worse, a partition of P; nor is it, at best, isomorphic 
to P. We have a more general case where equal cardinality of sets does not 
imply equal sets. 
  When sets differ in their structural properties, we face issues of 
knowledge asymmetry.6 It is in fact when the nonhomogenous character of 
                                                 
6 To our knowledge, Minkler (1993) is the only formalization of knowledge asymmetry in the 
context of organization. 
 
7 knowledge is taken into account that the familiar task of selecting among 
alternative organizational forms to attempt to maximize collective quasi-rents 
has added value. Otherwise, marginal benefits from integration would have 
the same magnitude of those from standard market contracts. In the case of 
the EU, for example, there would not be any rational  reason to bear the 
additional costs of complete integration through the creation of supranational 
government. Likewise, there would be no reason to devise complex, specific 
contracts, such as the SGP (or, vice versa, of thinking about what activities to 
spin-off from central government organization onto the national 
jurisdictions). 
  Organizational choice becomes a matter of indifference when 
endowments that allow for the internalization of externalities are – and are 
known to be – equal. Langlois encapsulates the point well in a germane 
context. 
If the only imperfections in knowledge at stake were those [of 
information asymmetry] then decentralized contracting would 
always be a cheap organizational alternative. This sort of 
imperfect information is precisely what state-contingent 
contracting, including the form practiced on organized futures 
markets, is all about. If all participants to a transaction really are 
aware of and certain about all the facts of the situation, and are 
in complete and detailed accord as to all possible contingencies, 
then decentralized market-contract arrangements should not be 
at a significant transaction-cost disadvantage (Langlois 1984, p. 
30). 
 
8 Similarly, Teece and Pisano (1994, p. 540) more recently write that “the 
distinctive elements of internal organization simply cannot be replicated in 
the market.” In his discussion of supranational federalism Hayek (1948, Ch. 
12, esp. pp. 268-9) too makes this point, if obliquely.7 
  The presence of a central government in a federal system may be 
justified on the basis of problems of knowledge asymmetry. Insofar as 
knowledge is asymmetric there arises the need of a coordinative entity that 
attempts to reduce knowledge asymmetry. When knowledge asymmetry 
approximates information asymmetry by, say, learning effects, the purpose of 
a central government withers away, ceteris paribus.8 
  The role of a decentralized system (such as a market or a local 
jurisdiction in a federal system) is, in other words, that of coordinating 
“common” knowledge, such as price and quantity. The role of a central 
government is, conversely, to attempt to coordinate knowledge that is more 
specific in nature. The latter task is often accomplished through gradual 
standard-setting procedures. The case of the EU is the first that comes to 
                                                 
7 It has in fact been up to contemporary scholars to make this point explicit in Hayek’s work. 
Cf. for instance Jensen and Meckling (1992); Ghoshal et al. (1995); and Langlois and Foss 
(1999). 
8 Those familiar with Knight’s (1946[1921], III.ix.8, p. 268) “cephalization” argument will 
readily note the parallel. 
 
9 mind in this respect. A current EU example of a standard-setting problem 
that is in the domain of a centralized government is software: should the EU 
bureaucratic apparatus move away from proprietary software and adopt 
free/open source software?9 
  Let us recast matters somewhat differently. If one concedes that we live 
in a world of change, the point is that a decentralized system may more 
readily adapt to change that is of a routine type. When, however, change is 
nonroutine – when it doesn’t involve just price and quantity but also the 
qualitatively new, such as technological or public policy changes – centralized 
organization (think of the firm as a parallel) may be more appropriate (cf. e.g. 
Langlois 1984; Silver 1984; Langlois and Foss 1999). 
  But the knowledge asymmetry approach immediately poses a new 
question: what are we to make of incomplete contracts? The answer may be 
given starkly: an incomplete contract may be interpreted not just as an 
instrument that exists to solve incentive conflicts, but also as a useful 
instrument that affords organizational versatility writ large. An incomplete 
contract may therefore be principally interpreted as an instrument for 
adaptation to change: as a means to (efficiently?) pursue plan coordination 
through time. Indeed, incompleteness of contracts is probably the primary 
                                                 
9 For a discussion of free/open source software, see Garzarelli (forthcoming). 
 
10 factor facilitating the maximization of joint rents (e.g., Egidi 1992, p. 168; Foss 
1996). “Longer, incomplete contracts provide much more flexibility because 
they eliminate haggling and communication costs and allow those who 
posses superior knowledge to direct less-informed others” (Langlois and Foss 
1999, p. 204). Or, to put it more generally, incompleteness of contracts leaves 
leeway for the correction of “coordination failures.”10  
  Consider again the SGP for illustration, an incentive contract that is 
clearly also incomplete. The SGP rests on the perspective of constitutional 
economics, which does not completely rule out the possibility of consciously 
designing some abstract systems of rules. The rationale is quite simple. It is 
believed that there are times when parties involved in transactions have a 
possibility to increase their welfare, as well as possibly that of others, by not 
only making the rules of the game explicit but also by credibly following 
them. We have an instance, in other words, where there’s conviction that 
there are gains from trade through intentionally limiting or constraining one’s 
choice set (Buchanan 1999[1990], esp. pp. 380-1). This is in effect a means to 
                                                 
10 Leijonhufvud (1981, Ch. 7). Aggregate coordination failures à la Leijonhufvud are most 
often the result of public institutional rigidities that do not allow for rapid contract 
adjustment. Think, as clear and current examples, of the strong labor unions in Italy which 
often oppose structural reforms such as the development of part time labor contracts or the 
possibility of direct hiring (and firing) in the public sector; and that for instance attempt to fix 
through legislation the weekly full-time employment contract to 35 hours (as in France). 
 
11 obtain predictability by creating inflexibility in action through the creation of 
common standards. It is a means to promote specialization as allowing for too 
much flexibility in action can be tantamount to limiting the ability of others to 
plan their own purposive action (cf. Heiner, e.g., 1983; Langlois, e.g., 1998). 
  The perspective of knowledge asymmetry, however, places equal 
importance on the flexibility aspect of incomplete contracts. In general we 
need not concern ourselves with the details of this remark here, but an 
additional point should be made. Specialization entails that there is less 
flexibility to solve problems that are unique, such as those mostly tied to 
knowledge asymmetry. That is to say that one is less apt to adapt to 
contingencies that do not involve just static or predictable problems typical of 
information asymmetry.11 As noted earlier, in fact, contractual 
incompleteness does not just regard the coordination of parametric changes 
(information), but also that of structural changes (knowledge). As currently 
conceived the SGP seems to leave little room for coordination of structural 
changes. There seems to be little incentive for national-level 
experimentation.12 
                                                 
 
11 For extensions, see Langlois (e.g., 1998). 
12 This is akin to the asymmetry critique to the SGP, namely, to the belief that the SGP focuses 
only on correcting negative incentives and not on stimulating the creation of new ones (see 




The primary motivation of this essay is to bring fiscal federalism theory into 
contact with a body of economic organization theory: it is the first attempt, to 
our knowledge, to endogenize some of the insights of the knowledge-based 
organizational literature into the federalism framework. We try to be 
suggestive and to point to new directions and to useful ideas from outside the 
areas of traditional interest to public economics students. 
  Notwithstanding the explorative nature of the essay, we can draw a 
reasonably general conclusion. It seems that from an economics of 
organization perspective centralization may be justified with less ambiguity 
on the basis of knowledge, as opposed to information, asymmetry. 
                                                                                                                                           
comparative-institutional viewpoint the highest level of flexibility would arguably be 
achieved through Coase Theorem interactions. Drawing on the experience of environmental 
markets Casella (1999) proposes one such solution: member states are allowed to trade 
budget deficit permits. The feasibility of such proposal remains an open question in the 
immediate run, however. As Brumila et al. (2001, Ch. 1) point out in the introduction to their 
edited volume, in fact, there may be empty core problems because of the relative immaturity 
of the SGP at this time. This may cause a higher level of uncertainty; hence greater 
knowledge asymmetry. See also Casella’s chapter in Brunila et al. (2001, Ch. 16). 
 
13 Knowledge asymmetry in fact encompasses information asymmetry as a 
special case. 
  A possible implication, to explore in detail in future work, is that one 
should consider the organizational problem of centralization versus 
decentralization of the public sector not so much from the point of view of the 
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